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C00003 00002	∂TO mitchell@rutgers (CC tgd)  11:45 20-Jan
C00012 00003	∂TO %rutgers mitchell, shooley 19:28 26-Jan
C00014 00004	∂29-Jan-82  0827	SCHOOLEY at RUTGERS 	analogy papers
C00019 00005	∂06-Feb-82  1106	SCHOOLEY at RUTGERS 	Re: Short answers  
C00022 00006	∂TO schooley@rutgers 17:46 13-Feb-82
C00026 00007	∂TO schooley@rutgers 20:39 13-Feb-82
C00043 00008	∂TO schoolery@rutgers 16:00 3-May-82
C00049 00009	∂09-Jul-82  1740	SCHOOLEY at RUTGERS 	a critique at last 
C00065 00010	∂TO schooley@rutgers 16:21 20-Jul-82
C00072 00011	∂TO schooley@rutgers 17:00 26-July-82
C00090 00012	∂TO schooley@rutgers 17:10 29-Jul-82
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∂TO mitchell@rutgers (CC tgd)  11:45 20-Jan
Uses of an Analogizing Program
Dr Mitchell,
	I'm just starting serious thesis work, and am looking for advice,
comments and an application domain.
The underlying research question is how to use analogy to enter new data
into an existing KB.

	My current quest is for specific examples of when someone took
an expert system, which worked on one task, and modified it to perform a
slightly different, but still closely related, task.
Tom Dietterich mentioned that you had just this experience, when you
twiddled the mass spec Dendral/MetaDendral system(s) to interpret NMR graphs.

	How well documented was this conversion?   Did you ever write up
the experiences and exasperations encountered during this ordeal?
In particular, where there many times you recall thinking that,
if only you had some analogizing mechanism, you could have saved a vast
amount of work.  

Two possible examples (of times when an analogy program would have been useful):
1. I imagine there were many times that the code used for the mass spec task 
would almost work for the new NMR application, but not quite.
Here you would have to generate a large amount of new code,
which was extremely similar to the original code --
both bodies of code performed, conceptually, the same process.
A sophisticated analogy using program could, perhaps, have made this alteration
automatically -- using its knowledge of the similarities and differences of
the two tasks, together with principles of programming.  (Yes, that would
be a very difficult task, even disregarding the analogy finding/using mechanism...
requiring a non-trivial "automatic programming" module.  The purpose of this
example was to refer to possible uses of analogies in this re-design process,
rather than this particular case.)

2. Another example involves the rules you gave this new Dendral-ish
system: when the rules used for one class of chemicals were essentially
identical to those for another class.
To illustrate, imagine you had just enterred the dozen rules specific to hydrates.
Now comes the time to enter the corresponding rules to be used for
ammoniates.  (To a first approximation,) these new rules should be deducable
from that first set -- making only the changes needed to distinguish
amine compounds from hydrozyl compounds.  
That is, each of these new rules should be analogous to a rule for hydrates.
However, you would have to tediously enter these rules, rather than simply
stating the obvious analogy (linking hydrates to ammoniates, using the known
hydroxyl to amine compound transformation), and letting the analogizing program
do the "busy" work necessary to generate the actual ammoniate rules.
-----

	I realize that the Dendral system is a poor domain for such an analogizing
program, basically due to its rather non-declarative KB,
greatly complicating the chore of reading and alterring its data.
Still, any insights you could offer
(on either this particular question, or on the overall task of analogizing) 
would be much appreciated.

Thanks,
	Russ

∂21-Jan-82  0813	mitchell at RUTGERS (Tom) 	Re: Uses of an Analogizing Program    
To: RDG at SU-AI
cc: Schooley at RUTGERS

Russ,
	That's kind of dim, dark past, but you are absolutely correct in
guessing that it was a frustratingly tedious task to redesign Meta-DENDRAL
to infer NMR rules.  One thing I remember strongly is that the relatively
small change in representation of the rules required small changes in a
million different places spread through the code.  These changes were almost
always the same conceptual change, but took forever to track down and make 
and debug.  A system that knew the difference between the representation of
the rule, the conceptual task that a piece of code was performing on the
rule, and the way the the representation affected the implementation of that
procedure might have been a real win.

	You are probably right that DENDRAL (as currently written) is not 
the place to look for a good domain.  How about studying
analogy in the area of user interfaces?  People who write real programs
spend a lot of time on user interfaces, and its not much fun.  For example,
think of when new utility routines appear on the DEC20 -- they generally 
have flaky interfaces compared to the more mature utilities, and one always
thinks - why don't they give it a good interface, sort of like this other
command has, but with these differences.  There's one practical domain
for analogy, that you might speak with Mike Genesereth about.

	It turns out that at Rutgers we have a research project whose main
focus is studying problem solving by analogy in the domain of digital 
circuit design.  The task we're addressing is: given a working circuit and 
its functional specifications, redesign the circuit to meet a required 
change in its function.  Right now we have a cluster of working papers, as 
well as a very sketchy paper in the last IJCAI.  We're currently working on
a prototype system.  One of the Ph.D. students working on this project, 
Pat Schooley, has written a working paper surveying work on analogy, and 
going through the design of a particular system.  She's currently 
preparing her thesis proposal in the general area of using analogy in
circuit redesign.  So you two might like to get in touch 
(Shooley@Rutgers). I'll ask her to send you her paper.

	Good luck with your thesis work - definitely keep me informed
of your progress - and I'll put you on the mailing list for our circuit
redesign project.

Cheers,
Tom
-------

∂TO %rutgers mitchell, shooley 19:28 26-Jan
∂TO %rutgers schooley 12:15 27-Jan
	(CC TGD)
Analogy-related things
Tom, Ms Schooley -
	Thanks for your quick response, and for adding me to your mailing
list. Also, please do send those papers.  My thesis proposal has grown
beyond a managable size, and is currently in need of drastic reconfiguration.
I'd still be pleased to send the current version over the net,
if you'd like to read it and add comments.
(Does Rutger's have a Dover-style printer?  If not I can SCRIBE the file
into a simpler, (but not as pretty) file.)

I have also generated reams of random thoughts on analogy.
While reading some of the psych/phil/AI literature on analogy,
I attempted to formulate a "naive analogy" theory,
a la Hayes' naive physics, or Tversky's naive statistics.
Using a small set of "intuitve" (read loosely defined) axes I've
begun distinquishing a few of the different senses of analogies,
I'm quite interested in comparing this with Ms Shooley's survey.
Anyway, this too I can send.

Please keep me informed of your progress.

Danke,
	Russ
∂29-Jan-82  0827	SCHOOLEY at RUTGERS 	analogy papers

   I do not currently have a copy of the survey paper on-line. I can send you
a copy through the mail if you can give me an address for doing so. The 
paper is a survey of AI systems that have attempted to use analogy in problem
solving  environments.
   The other paper I have done was completed for an independent study project
under Saul Amarel. It describes a geometry problem solving system which uses
analogy when presented with a new problem which is similar to a previously
solved problem. (Note: this system was never actually implemented as a 
computer program.) I would be happy to send a copy of this paper also.
   I would be quite interested to see what you have so far in terms of your
thesis proposal. It would also be quite helpful to me to exchange references
to analogy papers or systems that you have come across in your research.
I would of course be happy to share any sources  which I have that 
you may not have seen as yet.
   My thesis proposal on the use of analogy in digital circuit redesign
is still in a very rudimentary stage at this time. I would be quite 
interested in getting your commments on it as soon as I can get it into 
reasonable shape for you to read.
   Please do keep in touch and let me  know if there is anything I can do 
to help you out.
  Pat Schooley

-------

∂TO schooley@rutgers 12:49 2-Feb
Short answers
Pat:
	Thanks for your quick reply.  Yes, I would definitely like to see your 
AI survey.  I too have been scanning various areas of the literature...
disappointing, isn't it.
Anyway, my best snail mail address is
	Russ Greiner
	Margaret Jacks Hall
	Computer Science Department
	Stanford University
	Stanford, CA  94305-2085
(Given the precision of the 9 digit zip code, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th lines above
may be extraneous.  But they can't hurt...)

Please send your other paper as well.  I'm especially interesting in seeing how
your approach differs from Kling's Zorba, and hearing why it will work better
than Gelernter's (ancient) geometric theorem prover.

As to my miscellaneous thoughts, papers, musings:
I'm just finishing up that "naive analogy" digression; and will mail it on
completion.  The other document is my overgrown proto-proposal.
It too is deficient in many respects, and inaccurate in others.
There are, however, large subsets of it with which I'm quite happy.
Given that caveat, I'm quite willing to invite others to read it and
offer comments. Are you game?
(If so,) shall I snail mail a hard copy? (and to where?)
If not, would you prefer I ship over a press file,
(usable only if you have access to a Xerox "Dover" printer) or a less-elegant
version, requiring nothing more than the naked eye to read?  

Looking forward to continuing collaboration and mutual support,
	Russ 

∂06-Feb-82  1106	SCHOOLEY at RUTGERS 	Re: Short answers  

Russ,
     I am sending copies of my papers via "snail" mail -- do let me
know if they don't arrive in a reasonable amount of time. 
     I am more than game to read whatever you have done on your proposal
or anything else for that matter. The available literature on the use of
analogy in a problem solving domain is indeed sparse and disappointing!
I would also appreciate any references you have come across that I may not
have seen --- I will obviously reciprocate in that regard.
     It might be best at this point if you sent your papers to me via the
U.S. mail at
              Pat Schooley
              Department of Computer Science
              Rutgers University
              Hill Center
              Busch Campus
              New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903

      The opportunity to communicate with someone who has done a good deal of
reading and thought in the area of analogy is really a plus for me. There
don't seem to be that many of us around. I guess that means that people 
consider it to be either too trivial or too difficult a problem -- hopefully
neither is the case. At any rate I look forward to hearing more from you in 
the future.
    Pat Schooley
-------

∂TO schooley@rutgers 17:46 13-Feb-82
Mailings
Pat -

First, I look forward to reading your report(s).
(No, the "reasonable amount of time" you gave for their trip has not
yet passed.)
Second, there'll soon be a bunch of readings en route to you.  
They're mostly excerpts from an Analogy (Computer) Bulletin Board.
@BEGIN(Explanation)
Prof Lindley Darden, of the departments of Philosophy & History of Science 
at the University of Maryland,
has spent many years studying the areas of theory formation and analogy.
Her one term visit here, (from Sept to Dec 1980) proved very profitable 
for both parties  -- dispite our rather different backgrounds and perspectives,
we found we really were addressing essentially the same questions.

As many people wanted to continue the dialogue started during her stay,
we formed a distribution list of interested people, and have had many
lengthly (and occassionally significant) slow-motion conversations.
Anyway, I'm mailing a few of the ones I considered more interesting.

After reading them, let me know if you'd like to be added to the list.
(If you'd like to "talk" with Lindley, she can be reached as DARDEN@SUMEX.)

While on the topic of interested people, let me mention a few others:
	Doug Hofstadter, at U of Indiana (the author of "Godel, Escher, Bach")
is now working on a project (cutesily) named "Seek Whence" which is trying to
"do" analogies.
	Colleen Crangle, of the Philosophy dept here at Stanford, is also
looking into analogies.  She can be reached as (at?) CSD.GRANGLE@SCORE.
	Tom Dietterich, Steve Tappel and Mike Genesereth also have (varying
degrees of) interest in this topic.  Their respective net-addresses are
CSD.DIETTERICH@SCORE, STT@SAIL and CSD.GENESERETH@SCORE.

[Everyone but Doug is now on that analogy distribution list.
Of course a great many other local people have, at some point, indicated some
curiousity about this area, but nothing tangible.]
@END(Explanation)

I'm also mailing a copy of my proposal.
(I decided against biasing you by forwarding Lindley's comments on this draft,
and my subsequent responses --
I'll be glad to send them later if you think they might be relevant.)

The other paper is from some random people at Xerox... I had an extra copy.

My next (computer) message will be a partial list of references,
annotated with my comments/evaluations.

Enjoy,
	Russ
∂TO schooley@rutgers 20:39 13-Feb-82
Misc Readings on Analogy/Metaphor (and related things)
I. Metaphor, Analogy [nonAI]

@Book(Black,
Key = "Black",
Author = "Black, Max",
Title = "Models and Metaphors",
Publisher = "Cornell University Press",
Address = "Ithica", Year = 1962)
@Comment<(For some reason) considered one of the classics.
Title not withstanding, only 2 articles on metaphor.
Those (and 3rd, on Whorf) are worth reading... (see Searle, in M&T)
The rest is on the nature of nature, etc.
I was a bit disappointed -- as much of reasoning seemed sloppy, and
based on too many [implicit] assumptions.
Core idea was that it was useful to use models in understanding something;
and that understanding from model, and understanding via analogy, were
similar processes -- both "non decompositional".  See Boyd, in M&T.)>

@Book(Lakoff,
Key = "Lakoff",
Author = "Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark",
Title = "Metaphors We Live By",
Publisher = "The University of Chicago Press",
Address = "Chicago", Year = 1980)

@Article(Hof81,
Key = "Hofstadter",
Author = "Hofstadter, Douglas",
Title = "Roles and Analogies in Real and Artificial Worlds",
Extra = "In Metamathetical Themas section",
Journal = "Scientific American",
Month = SEP, Year = 1981)
@Comment<Cute, as usual.  Some relevance to real world; basically
gives the first few obvious facts about analogy, and some
nice examples to drive home his points.>

@Book(M&T,
Key = "Ortony",
Editor = "Ortony, Andrew",
Title = "Metaphor and Thought",
Publisher = "Cambridge University Press", Address = "Cambridge", Year = 1979)
@Comment< Excellent book, with many first rate articles.
Initial overview good, as were chapters by Searle, Ortony, Paivio?
	Rumbelhart, (parts of) Boyd
Reddy's chapter was worth reading, but probably irrelevant.>

@Book(Hesse,
Key = "Hesse",
Author = "Hesse, Mary",
Title = "Models and Analogy in Science",
Publisher = "University of Notre Dame Press", Address = ?,
Year = 1966)
@Comment< So-so -- good at presenting one view of analogy (as matching slots)
(That approach seems way too superficial to work, I feel)
Do read the section on Aristotle, and his view.>

@TechReport(Gentner,
Key = "Gentner",
Author = "Gentner, Dedre",
Title = "The Structure of Analogical Models in Science",
Institution = "Bolt, Beranek and Newman Inc.",
Number = 4451,
Month = JUL, Year = 1980)
@Comment< Worth reading.  She takes the view that the structure of a model
is preserved, not the simple attributes.  (Ie N-ary relations are
significant, while unary relations are incidental.)
... at least in a good science analogy (which is explanatory/predictive)
(Sure... this gives one good HEURISTIC for evaluating a proposed analogy.
Note this approach is quite representation dependent -- ie what makes
some fact a Binary relation rather than a unary one?  This is discussed
in one of the BBD messages.)>

@InProceedings(GentnerA,
Key = "Gentner",
Author = "Gentner, Dedre",
Title = "Studies of Metaphor and Complex Analogies",
Booktitle = "Symposium on Metaphor as Process",
Organization = "A.P.A", Address = "Montreal",
Month = SEP, Year = 1980)
@Comment< She here tries to demonstrate that unary/binary distinction,
by conducting a psychological experiment. (Yawn)>

@Article(Interfield,
Key = "Darden",
Author = "Darden, Lindley and Maull, Nancy",
Title = "Interfield Theories",
Journal = "Philosophy of Science",
Volume = 44, Pages = "43-64",
Year = 1977)
@Comment< Lindley has several papers on "Interfield connections" --
where one can reason about one field (eg genetics) using facts
from another field (consider proto-biochemistry).  This is stronger
than a random analogy -- here there is some "real" reason why
the facts should be linked.>

@Article(NewFields,
Key = "Darden",
Author = "Darden, Lindley",
Title = "Discovery and the Emergence of New Fields in Science",
Journal = "Philosophy of Science",
Publisher = "Philosophy of Science of America Publication",
Editors = "P. Asquith and I. Hacking",
Volume = 1, Pages = "149-160",
Year = 1978)
@Comment< see above>

@TechReport(R&N,
Key = "Rumelhart",
Author = "Rumelhart, David E. and Norman, Donald A.",
Title = "Analogical Processes in Learning",
Institution = "University of California, San Diego",
Number = 8005,
Month = SEP, Year = 1980)
@Comment< Not yet read. >

II. Analogy [AI]

@InProceedings(M&M,
Key = "Genesereth",
Author = "Genesereth, Micheal R.", 
Title = "Metaphors and Models",
Booktitle = "1-AAAI",
Organization = SU, Pages = "208-211",
Month = AUG, Year = 1980)
@Comment< Must read.  A different view/use of analogy.
View: as shared partial theory (see my proposal)
Use: to use efficient data structures
This paper is unfortunately, difficult to understand.
(my subtitle: "What is the Meta in Metaphor For?")>

@InProceedings(Carbonella,
Key = "Carbonell",
Author = "Carbonell, Jaime",
Title = "Invariance Hierarchy in Metaphor Interpretation",
Pages = "292-295",
Booktitle = "3-Cognitive Science",
Organization = "University of California, Berkeley",
Month = AUG, Year = 1981)
@Comment< Nice set of heuristics for evaluating/generating a good analogy --
based on reasonable introspection, nothing more.>

@InProceedings(Carbonellb,
Key = "Carbonell",
Author = "Carbonell, Jaime,", 
Title = "A Computational Model of Analogical Problem Solving",
Pages = "147-152",
Booktitle = "7-IJCAI",
Organization = "University of British Columbia",
Month = AUG, Year = 1981)
@Comment< See above.>

@Article(Kling,
Key = "Kling",
Author = "Kling, Robert E.",
Title = "A Paradigm for Reasoning by Analogy",
Journal = "Artificial Intelligence", Year = 1971, Pages = "147-178",
Volume = 2)
@Comment< Zorba program - for transfering proofs from one area (eg Group theory)
to rings.  Basically exploited isomorphisms. (Anything else?)>

@InCollection(Evans,
Key = "Evans",
Author = "Evans, Thomas G.",
Title = "A Program for Solution of Geometric-Analogy Intelligence Test Questions",
Booktitle = "Semantic Information Processing",
Editor = "Marvin Minsky", Year = 1968,
Publisher = "The MIT Press",
Address = "Cambridge")
@Comment< Solved A:B :: C : ? for ? in {1 2 3 4 5} by matching (predefined) features
found transformation which took A to B, and applied that to C.
(Did some constraint relaxing if no match found...)
Use the obvious, straightforward methods.  
(Even in '66 considered trivial and uninterested.)>

@TechReport(Ana,
Key = "McDermott",
Author = "McDermott, John",
Title = "Learning to Use Analogies",
Institution = CMU, Year = 1979)
@Comment< Not read >

@TechReport(RBrown,
Key = "Brown",
Author = "Brown, Richard",
Title = "Use of Analogies to Achieve New Expertise",
Institution = MIT, Month = APR, Year = 1979, Number = "AI-TR-403")
@Comment< Deals with generating programs "by analogy"
Analogizes from one plan to another.
[From Plan => Program => Code]
Poorly written - ie confusing
depends on pre-defined type hierarchy
not implemented, very unconvincing -- whole task is unimpressive ...
defn of analogy very confusing.>

@Article(Winston,
Key = "Winston",
Author = "Winston, Patrick H.",
Title = "Learning and Reasoning by Analogy", Pages = "689-703",
Journal = "Communications of the ACM",
Month = DEC, Year = 1980,
Volume = 23, Number = 12)
@Comment< Superficial analysis, assuming "obvious" facts about the world.
(Why is Macbeth more like Hamlet? ...)>

III. Analogy [CS, not AI]

@Article(M&Ua,
Key = "Moll",
Author = "Moll, Robert and Ulrich, John Wade",
Title = "Program Synthesis by Analogy",
Journal = "SIGART Newsletter", Volume = "12", Number = "8", Month = AUG,
Year = 1977, Pages = "22-28")
@Comment <Took one program, and twiddled it to do different
task.  Seems unextendable.
Authors addressed obvious shortcomings.>

@InProceedings(M&Ub,
Key = "Moll",
Author = "Moll, Robert and Ulrich, John Wade",
Title = "The Synthesis of Programs by Analogy",
Pages = "592-594",
Booktitle = "6-IJCAI", Organization = "Tokyo", Month = AUG, Year = 1979)
@Comment< see above. >

@InProceedings(Harmful,
Key = "Halasz",
Author = "Halasz, Frank and Moran, Thomas P.",
Title = "Analogy Considered Harmful",
Pages = "?",
Booktitle = "Human Factors in Computer Systems",
Organization = "National Bureau of Standards",
Address = "Gaithersburg, Maryland", Month = MAR, Year = 1982)
@Comment< Justifiably criticizes superficial, one-track analogies.
They fail to realize the fault is not with the idea of analogy,
but with the particular simplistic approach they are showing.>

@TechReport(Evolution,
Key = "Dershowitz",
Author = "Dershowitz, Nachum and Manna, Zohar",
Title = "The Evolution of Programs: A System for Automatic Program Modification",
Number = "AIM-294",
Institution = CSDSU,
Month = DEC, Year = 1976)
@Comment< Modifying a program to achieve a different goal.
Must already have the analogy map.  It can use the correspondences to
transform the code. >

@TechReport(Chen/Findler,
Key = "Chen",
Author = "Chen, David T. W. and Findler, Nicholar V.",
Title = "Toward Analogical Reasoning in Problem Solving by Computers",
Number = "115",
Institution = "State University of New York at Buffalo",
Type = "Department of Computer Science",
Month = DEC, Year = 1976)
@Comment< not yet read >

@TechReport(Thibadeau,
Key = "Thibadeau",
Author = "Thibadeau, Robert",
Title = "Reaching (For) an Understanding about Analogy",
Number = "DCS-TM-8",
Institution = "Rutgers",
Type = "Department of Computer Science",
Month = MAY, Year = 1977)
@Comment< not yet read >

@InProceedings(Clement,
Key = "Clement",
Author = "Clement, John",
Title = "Analogy Generation in Scientific Problem Solving",
Pages = "137-140",
Booktitle = "3-Cognitive Science",
Organization = "University of California, Berkeley",
Month = AUG, Year = 1981)
@Comment< not yet read >

IV. Misc additional readings
	Polya's books, of course
	AM (and now Eurisko) talked a bit of using analogy in its work.
	New stuff by Winston (more of CACM, unfortunately)

Stuff on reformulation -- Amarel.

Not read:
	Suppe's "The Structure of Scientific Theories"

	Tversky 1977
	Shepard 1974

	Leatherdale, WH - "The Role of Analogy, Model and Metaphor in Science"
	[North Holland, 1974]

	Lorenz, K.Z., "Analogy as a source of Knowledge" (Nobel Prize Lecture given
	in Stockholm on Dec 12, 1973).  in "Lez Prix Nobel en 1973", Elsevier:
	New York, 1974.
∂TO schoolery@rutgers 16:00 3-May-82
Analogy this-and-that
Pat -
	First, I asked Lindley to add you and Richard Keller to the ANALOGY
bulletin board.  (which has been silent for several months, for various
reasons.)  Second, I've been working on a "What's in an Analogy"
paper for several months now.  I now have a draft ready, and am searching
for comments.  Would you be interested in reading it?
If so, shall I snail mail it there, or could I transmit a DOCument file over the
net?  (That file is already to go.)
Finally, I have several comments about your papers.  Might they be relevant?
(or have you moved onto some other area?)

	Let me know what sort of lines you are pursuing now,
whenever you feel confortable discussing them.

	Russ

∂13-May-82  1747	SCHOOLEY at RUTGERS 	Re: Analogy this-and-that    
To: RDG at SU-AI
In-Reply-To: Your message of 3-May-82 1907-EDT

Russ,
   Sorry to be so non-communicative lately. I have been ill and in fact 
took an unofficial leave from Rutgers. I am hoping to be back within
the next week or two. 
  I would like to read your new paper on analogy. If you could send a 
copy to Tom Mitchell I can get it from him and see to it that the other 
people at Rutgers who are interested in analogy are given copies.
  I am still working on analogy -- in particular on the application of
analogy to the problem of circuit redesign.  I would be very interested in
your comments on my papers.  I'll send you my thesis proposal on the topic
of analogical circuit redesign when it is in a little more coherent form.
   Pat
-------
***

∂TO schooley@rutgers 14:08 2-June-82
Quickies
Pat -
	Now it's my turn to apologize for non-communicativeness.  While my
excuse is not as impressive as your's, life has been hectic here, for various
reasons.  Anyway, I hope you are feeling better -- and that whatever it was
you had is not contagious, especially over ARPAnet wires.
Was the "unofficiality" of your leave due to difficulty in obtaining an 
official leave from Rutgers, or some statement on the nature of your illness?

	While reliving the past, that paper (a naive view of analogy) should
have arrived -- it was mailed about 25 May 82.
Feel free to circulate it to anyone interested.

	I'm curious to hear any comments you may have on the various papers 
I mailed a few months ago?  (I assume you received them.)
In particular, what did you think of the discussion on the varied types 
of analogy (mapping vs common theory vs ...).  

	Realizing that my list of analogy-related references was complete,
I'm eager to see your additions; and to hear of your reflections on my
"appraisals".

	The balance of this message are my comments on your papers.
I should mention that these are based on jotting recorded when I first
read them, several months ago (which were quickly re-examined as I glanced
through them today).

	I found your CS602 report fairly useful.
It seemed to cover most of the relevant research (or at least the ones
that I know of).
The information in these summaries made it farily easy to differentiate
these various program(me)s; which was useful for formulating my thoughts.
(These examples also provided a nice, independently-generated test-bed with
which to test the "completeness" of the dimensions laid out in the naive paper.
If I do manage to perform that analysis, I'll send you the results.)

	I had a few points/questions about your CS-702 writeup, but will
mail them in a subsequent message.  (Basically I've been delaying mailing
this until I compose that critique, which keeps slipping off the bottom of
my stack.)

	Bye for now,
Russ

∂09-Jul-82  1740	SCHOOLEY at RUTGERS 	a critique at last 
To: greiner at SU-AI

    I have finally finished reading the material you sent me ages ago.
Before I get to my comments there are a few general questions I have for you.
Both Tom Mitchell and Rich Keller (at Rutgers) would like to be included in
the Analogy BBOARD. Speaking of the BBOARD, how does one access it? Rich
Keller is working with Tom Mitchell on LEX. Paul Utgoff is working on LEX
also -- trying to find a way to alter the generalization language for the
Version Space program when the predefined generalization language proves
insufficient for the generalization task. His work may be of interest to you
in relation to your problem of defining the relevant set of properties for
forming an analogy.
    To answer your question -- my "unofficial" leave was a kindness on Rutgers
part so that they could continue to pay my RA salary. I have been having
trouble with ulcers and could not predict how long I would be out of commision.
I am finally feeling better and at least working a part-time schedule again.
   
-------
∂12-Jul-82  1254	SCHOOLEY at RUTGERS 	a critique at last 
To: greiner at SU-AI

I have finally finished reading the material which you sent to me ages ago.
Before I get to my comments I have a few general questions to ask you.
How does one access the Analogy BBOARD?  Speaking of the BBOARD, both Tom
Mitchell and Rich Keller would like to be added to the list. Rich is working
with Tom on Lex this summer -- I believe his interest is in adding analogizing
capabilities to Lex.  Paul Utgoff is also working on Lex -- attempting to 
create a new generalization language for the Version Space program when the
predefined generalization  anguage proves insufficient for the current 
generalization task. His work might be of interest to you in relation to your
problem of defining "on the fly" a set of relevant properties of the analogues
being considered.
     To answer your question -- my "unoficial" leave from Rutgers was a 
kindness on the part of the CS dept. so that they could continue to pay 
me my RA salary. I have been having troubles with ulcers and could not 
predict how long I would be out of commission. I am feeling much better 
and working again at least on a part-time schedule.
     Your list of references is more complete than mine -- your short
critiques were very helpful to me- thanks.  My interest in analogy is
focused on its use as a problem solving tool. Specifically, I am interested
in what help analogy can provide to the task of redesigning an existing
system to produce a system satisfying an altered set of specifications.
The domain I am looking at currently is digital circuit design. My current 
approach is to develop proofs that each of the specs of an existing circuit
are actually satisfied by that circuit and then to use these proofs to 
guide the redesign ala the geometry problem solver (I did send you that
paper didn't I).
    Now to my comments on your papers -- I'll list the comments by the 
page in the paper where the thought occurred to me -- hope that is 
intelligible to you.
   First, comments on Analogies and things like that , Feb.8, 1981 (hope
this is not too old a version by now)
    I liked this paper very much and found it easy to read and understand.
 Page 3 -- def of analogy- I don't see the distinction between your def
    using shared partial theory and a mapping between entities that
    preserves the relations between entities as well as the properties 
    of matched entities. The shared partial theory seems to be simply
    a statement of the properties of entities and the relations between 
    entities. If the preservation of the relations between entities is used
    to limit the allowable entity mappings aren't you accomplishing the
    same thing without the necessity for discovering some abstract common
    theory underlying each of the analogues? In fact, how else are you
    ever going to find the shared partial theory?

page 4 -- allowing users to alter the rules for analogizing seems 
    appropriate since analogies are often very subjective -- this may
    be a rather formidable task since I suspect the rules will not be 
    simple ones covering all analogy tasks. The user may be hard- put
    to come up with any valid rules of his own.

page 7 -- deciding when a sufficiently good analogy has been found can 
    also be very subjective (or can be based on what the the analogy is to 
    be used for). Do you envision automatically checking whether the analogy 
    is sufficient for its intended use?

page 9 --- I see the ability to limit the generated analogies by specifying
    constraints as essential -- Rich Keller has looked at limiting the set
    of applicable problem solving production rules by looking at the
    "context" of the current problem state. His paper may be of interest 
    to you.

page 14 --- generating a Meta-Facts KB that is any way sufficient or
    complete for finding most analogies ought to earn you a PhD all by
    itself. How do you plan to approach this problem?

I have to leave the terminal for a bit. I'll send a critique of your
other paper in another message shortly.
 Be right back!
Pat Schooley
-------

∂TO schooley@rutgers 16:21 20-Jul-82
"Cover Letter"
Pat -
	This is just a "cover letter", overhead to the (hopefully) more
substantial messages to follow.

(1) First, I hope you are continuing to feel better (both in an "absolute"
sense, and in the "first derivative" sense -- of ongoing improvements.)

(2) Do you plan to be in AAAI this August?
I'm considering arriving there a day early, to meet with the wealth of
people I'm not seen for such a long time.  Lindley is also considering that
idea.  (If you are going,) when do you plan to arrive?

(3) Yes, I did receive your critiques on both that early thesis proposal,
and that "everything I know about analogy" paper.  Thank you for spending
the considerable time and energy needed first to plow thru them, and then
to generate your responces.
I'm now addressing/answering many of the excellent issues you raised;
I'll of course send that document on completion.

(4) I'll also mail a more recent (short) proposal.
I'm actually beginning to (seriously consider doing work towards)
implementing it.

(5) I still have a set of comments on your 702 paper, which I have to commit
to paper (as well as rethink) before mailing to you.  Soon...

(6) Lindley wants to get the analogy bboard going again. Any ideas for a starting
topic?  Perhaps something nice and well-defined, like "what is an analogy"
would be appropriate...  Stay tuned for future developments.

(7) I had an hour talk with Rick Hayes-Roth recently; not on my thesis topic
per se, as much as on the nature of theses in general.  
One point he raised was on the *real* purpose of the work:
was my thesis to be the solution to a real problem, or a labor of love?
Given that there is no solid evidence that analogies are of any value,
(beyond the usual wealth of introspective data and intuitions in general,)
I had to confess my purpose must be the latter.
Have you thought how you would catalogue your work, and answer the question
of why you are doing it?

----
Enough for now.  Do expect a horde of messages to follow,

Russ

∂23-Jul-82  0800	SCHOOLEY at RUTGERS 	Re: "Cover Letter" 
To: RDG at SU-AI
In-Reply-To: Your message of 20-Jul-82 1921-EDT

Russ,
   I am planning to attend AAI and will be arriving in the evening of 8/17.
Hope to see you there.
   You're discussion with Rick Hayes-Roth sounds similar to discussions 
we have had here at Rutgers. Trying to do a thesis on the topic of
analogy per se seems not only difficult but rather esoteric and of 
dubious practical value. I have drifted in the direction of working
on what could be labelled re-planning (if one has a working digital
circuit and a plan telling how it was designed, how can this info be
used to redesign the circuit to meet an altered set of circuit 
specifications). This appears to be a more practical problem which
is still an application of a limited form of analogy (at least it appears
that analogy is involved when humans perform such redesign tasks).
   There are several people (including me) here at Rutgers who would
be interested in reviving the Analogy BBOARD. I would be especially 
interested in seeing a discussion of the practical uses of analogy.
(i.e. some atempt at categorizing the different practical uses of 
analogy by humans and defining the differences between these uses.)
For example, is there some basic difference between the use of analogy
as a problem solving device and the use of analogy in knowledge 
acquisition?  Do let me know if the BBOARD is revived -- there is 
definitely an interest here in participating in such discussions.
    Your new proposal sounds interesting -- the thought occurred to me
that you might be interested in the work that has been done here at
Rutgers on the EXPERT system. This work involved the development
of medical diagnostic data bases. In particular, the required 
interaction with medical experts during the development of the data
bases might be of interest to you. Let me know if I can help you
get any papers from here that might be of interest.
   Hope to see you in August!
Pat Schooley
-------

∂TO schooley@rutgers 17:00 26-July-82
Responses to your comments on my paper
****
   >> from message, [∂12-Jul-82  1254  SCHOOLEY@RUTGERS   a critique at last]
   >> my response: 19-Jul
[My comments are bracketed with ****s]
****

       First, comments on Analogies and things like that , Feb.8, 1981 (hope
    this is not too old a version by now)

****
My thesis ideas have gone through several iterations since then 
-- note that my more recent thesis proposal bears only cosmetic 
similarities to the document you just read.
However, many of the comments you made were still quite relevant;
and well worth addressing.
****

	I liked this paper very much and found it easy to read and understand.

     Page 3 -- def of analogy- I don't see the distinction between your def
	using shared partial theory and a mapping between entities that
	preserves the relations between entities as well as the properties 
	of matched entities. The shared partial theory seems to be simply
	a statement of the properties of entities and the relations between 
	entities. If the preservation of the relations between entities is used
	to limit the allowable entity mappings aren't you accomplishing the
	same thing without the necessity for discovering some abstract common
	theory underlying each of the analogues? In fact, how else are you
	ever going to find the shared partial theory?
****
There is a subtle, but very important distinction; one I've always 
found difficult to communicate.  Perhaps this description will be less vague
than the brief one given in that paper.  
(I've also included a few examples throughout this comment, which may help
to illustrate some of the points.)
[The "reformulation" addendum in the more recent proposal also addresses this
issue; also rather poorly.]

This "shared partial theory" approach is "model-based", rather than 
"representation-based".
Critically examine the mapping approach:
Here one maps components/relations/features/etc from one analogue to the other.
Realize these components/... do NOT depend (directly) on the analogues themselves,
but rather of the particular REPRESENTATIONS of those objects.
Hence to consider a mapping from parts of the objects,
one must first have a suitable representation/decomposition of the analogues,
one which defines these components, and their interrelations.

Realize that a single object may have many different descriptions.
[For example, there are at least two totally different ways to describe a
program -- it could be described structurally, (in terms of their internal code,
or abstractions thereof,) or behaviourally (i.e. based on what it does, I/O-wise).  
And each of the descriptions would give rise to to a different analogy-mapping --
two "structurally similar" programs may exhibit totally different behaviour,
(e.g. both MAPC and LENGTH map down along a list, performing some operation
at each position);
and vice versa -- consider a BUBBLE-SORT which deals with a linked list,
and a SHELL-SORT of an array.]

(A sillier example comes from McCarthy, who suggests that a Martian,
on encountering a room filled with people,
might figure that all 20 left arms constitute one individual,
the 20 right legs another, etc.
Hence it (the Martian - or maybe "they") would claim there were 6 individuals in
the room, 
(viz., "left arm unit", "right arm unit", "left leg unit", "right leg unit", 
"head unit" and "trunk unit")
rather than the "obviously correct" answer of 20 individual people.
We would of course expect that the analogies it would make would be
considerably different from ones you or I might compose.)

Now consider the "spt" approach.  These spt-derived analogies are NOT dependent
on any particular representation, (at least in its [unrealizable] generality). 
Such an analogy, instead, could be based on ANY set of properties of the
analogues themselves; rather than just those features which happen to be
captured in some particular description of these objects.
Hence, with this approach, two objects could still be classified as analogous,
even if, in their "universally accepted" representation they have totally
different symbols, employ totally unrelated relations, and correspond to a
totally different "cut" of the objects involved.

In terms of implementation, this distinction rapidly collapses.  While the
spt approach does allow ANY representation of the analogues to be used,
no computer (nor any person) has more than a few different descriptions of
any object.  Given this small finite number of independent representations,
one can usually just merge these perspectives.
(In the program case, this means using the representation derived by merging
the structural and behaviour descriptions.)

My point, in making that spt comment, reflected my disagreement with the
claim made (implicitly) by many researchers that there is a single 
"universally accepted" way of describing any object;
and that any analogies which uses this object as an analogue
must simply deal with the symbols used in this representation.
I feel there are times when the current representation is inadequate;
either heuristically or epistemologically.
I futher belabour this point in the "Reformulation" section of the "What's
an Analogy Like" paper.

Consider the "endocrine system is like blood" example used in my mini-proposal.
There is probably no mapping of symbols from the pre-existent 
"endocrine system theory" to the standard "blood theory" which captures
the intent of this message. The trick here is to first define new symbols 
-- such as "ThroughPut of Circuit", and other features and relations 
which pertain to both such instances of Circulating Material Flow.
Then, after this reformulation, the analogy will be simply a mapping,
from one (newly generated) representation to the other.

Does any of this make sense?  If you can see a clearer way of presenting this,
please let me know.
****

    page 4 -- allowing users to alter the rules for analogizing seems 
	appropriate since analogies are often very subjective -- this may
	be a rather formidable task since I suspect the rules will not be 
	simple ones covering all analogy tasks. The user may be hard- put
	to come up with any valid rules of his own.
****
Two comments -- 
(1) Providing the user with the facility for modifying
the rules fits into my tirade against single-representation-ness;
(also examplified above.)
I.e., s/he can not only twiddle the representation,
s/he can also re-define the rules which are "run" over these descriptions as well.

(2) There will clearly be various classes of rules, (as I see it).
Some will pertain to all manners of analogies 
(e.g. Two analogues probably belong to several of the same classes), while
others will be quite domain specific (e.g. Two diseases are considered similar
if they share a common set of symptoms.)  
Rules of the first class will probably not undergo much changes -- while the
user is allowed to modify them, they are sufficiently general and
"common-sense"-ical that they will probably stay fairly static.
(Of course this reflects only my feelings, which will soon be subjected to
various empirical tests.)  
Those other domain-dependent rules, by definition, will vary across domains.
What does it mean for two iteration descriptions to be similar?  
The above "two diseases ..." rule says nothing directly relevant to this
task.  (Indirectly, of course, it does indicate that, in some situations,
behavior is very relevant; this may hint at what types of properties to
consider when comparing two program-abstractions. Clearly we need to find
a new heuristic which is analogous to that old rule...)
****

    page 7 -- deciding when a sufficiently good analogy has been found can 
	also be very subjective (or can be based on what the the analogy is to 
	be used for). Do you envision automatically checking whether the analogy 
	is sufficient for its intended use?
****
Good idea.  This was the type of issue which led me to deal with
the Knowledge Acquisition task, shown in latest proposal.
Here the purpose to the analogy is fairly well understood,
as is the criteria for success 
(i.e. does the ES now use this new operator in solving a particular problem?).

Of course I still want to leave the user with the option of specifying
"when to stop", perhaps by defining what type of analogies are required.
It's not clear how often this facility would be used, if at all.
Anyway, I'll leave this as a research question for now.
****

    page 9 --- I see the ability to limit the generated analogies by specifying
	constraints as essential -- Rich Keller has looked at limiting the set
	of applicable problem solving production rules by looking at the
	"context" of the current problem state. His paper may be of interest 
	to you.
****
Sounds fascinating.  Could you (get him to) send me a copy?
****

    page 14 --- generating a Meta-Facts KB that is any way sufficient or
	complete for finding most analogies ought to earn you a PhD all by
	itself. How do you plan to approach this problem?
****
?most? If I can get it to do a few analogies, from each of two or three
domains, I'll consider this a success.
My basic m.o. is, for now, fairly empirical: work through some simple examples,
and see, based on these, what types of things I need.  I will then try to find
some "basic underlying principle" which was involved in all of these specific
rules, together with the "specifying principles" which would have been
sufficient to have generated these specific rules from those
general, domain-independent rules.

... and of course I'll be relying on other people, such as yourself, to
contribute other facts, heuristics, meta-facts, ...
Given the state of the science (read "artform") of analogizing in specific,
and of encoding expertise in general, I don't see any other approach.  Do you?
****

    -------
****
That's all for now.  Please feel free to send rebuttals or further comments
on these quips -- in fact, I'm sure such responses (to my responses to your ...)
would be quite valuable.

I'll be sending along my comments on your other comments (on my "What's ...") soon;
and my long-promised notes on your 702 paper.

A few final quick comments:

(i) Will you attend the upcoming Cognitive Science conference in UMich?
It will include a "State of the Art Symposium" on Metaphor.
[I'll not be there -- I found the last of their conferences too disappointing.
While the invited papers were nice, the (unrefereed) general papers will 
uniformly terrible.]

(ii) Rereading my message of 3-May-82, I found a rather pompous
"... Realizing that my list of analogy-related references was complete, ";
Oops - that last word, of course, should have been "INcomplete".
Please send along other references you may have.

(iii) [wrt your more recent message] Yes, I do know a bit about Expert 
(from the ESBS converence two summers ago).  So thanks for the offer for
additional information, but no, I don't think it would be that useful.

(iv) Yes, let's start BBoarding.  Ideas for topics?  Perhaps this "representation"
vs "model" based distinction should be aired there?

---
Take care, & see you in August,
	Russ
****
∂TO schooley@rutgers 17:10 29-Jul-82
"What's in an Analogy" comments**2
Pat -

****
Zeroth, some preliminary meta-notes:
   >> from message, [∂15-Jul-82  0926  SCHOOLEY@RUTGERS   more comment ]
   >> my response  26-Jul-82

0: Fastest mail address to me is RDG@SU-AI 
	(GREINER@SAIL does indeed reach me, by the way...)
1: This paper underwent a non-trivial reorganization after I mailed it to you;
	making the page numbers next to meaningless.  It would have been
	useful to see the section number as well as the page number...
2: Would you mind if I send this to Lindley, and allow her to join in this
	discussion?
****
****
Onto general comments:
1) I apparently gave an inaccurate impression of the purpose of this "magnus opus".
	My goal was basically to set down a lot of ideas running through my head;
	it was NOT to produce a definitive, final word on the topic of analogies.
	I hope to use comments, from people such as yourself, to refine and augment
	these superficial first thoughts into solid arguments.

   So, please keep your comments comings...
	and continue to point out which ideas were not effectively communicated, 
	or seem unacceptably fuzzy... [see point 3), below]

2) Your comments seem to imply that you consider two things (e.g. cases of analogy)
	to be the same if the same procedure can be used to handle both of them.
	While this is indeed one way the two things can be similar, there are
	still many other dimensions in which these objects can differ.

   My vision is of an N-dimensional space of analogies --
	in which one can locate any given instance of an analogy in
	(exactly) one place.  Here I am considering not only the
	process required to "solve this analogy problem", but also the
	situation in which this analogy occured (i.e. was only one
	individual involved, or several,) the "problem context", (whether the
	end goal was to find the other analogue, or to more completely
	describe some object, or ...), etc.

   In fact, one of the main purposes of this report was to (roughly) lay out 
	those dimensions.  Anyway, I'll elaborate on this while responding to
	your comments below.

3) In several places I puzzled over (read: challenged) some of the phrases
	you used.  Another major goal of this paper is to hone up some
	intuitive notions we all have -- to where, eventually, these vague
	fuzzy terms can be given a precise, unambiguous interpretation.

   I hope this exacting style does not come across as hostile.
	If it does, please realize that does not reflect my intent,
	but rather my evaluative purpose, and (occasionally overly-gruff)
	speaking style.
****


    Russ,
	Please forgive any garbled or incomplete messages -- I've been having  
    trouble with my home terminal. Actually, I think the problem is really with 
    the telephone lines. At any rate let me know if the first set of comments
    did not arrive in readable form.
****
I got the first few paragraphs of your previous message twice, but the
full msg only the second time.  What was sent was readily readable.
****
       Following are comments on "What's an Analogy Like?" 18 May 1982

      When you are presenting a set of axes for the space of analogies you use
    the term "orthogonal" axes. How are you defining the term "orthogonal"?
    In relation to a vector space (which the space of analogies is not) orthogonal
    implies independent. I am not convinced that even the final set of axes which
    you present are truly independent. 
****
No, this is precisely the impression I was trying to avoid.
While a grandious goal is to present a collection of truly orthogonal axes,
(is "truly orthogonal" like "slightly pregnant"?... oh well,) I
fully realize that these particular features are cearly not independent
of one another.  Sorry to have mislead you.  In my current draft,
this report declares that it will attempt to present
	... a semi-formal specfication of the space of analogies.
	Our eventual goal is a description of the properties of this space;
	this paper concludes with a first approximation to this,
	motivated and justified by the results presented in the earlier chapters.
****

      Are the "senses" of analogy which you present in 3.1 really distinct? As 
    you point out the similarity case and the proportional case can be considered
    the same. I look at the familial resemblance case as an extension of the
    binary relation "similar" to an n-ary relation. If you disagree with this,
    how do you view the familial resemblance case?
****
Two comments:
i) Let me rephrase my point --
I feel that these three senses seem to be interesting positions 
along some dimension(s) -- at least according to my intuitions.
(See General Comment #1 above.)
I had hoped that any task could be placed in exactly one of these categories.
Do you have any specific example which could belong to more than one of these,
or which fits into none of them?  
(Well, as I write thigs, I have to conceed that something like
"the jawbones of the following species resemble one another" would be difficult
to classify -- here a "proportional-like analogy" is extended to more than
two cases.)

ii) The second issue deals with the issue of what it means for two cases of
analogies to be "considered the same".
The fact that a single process may be able handle both certain types of
similarity-analogizing tasks and proportional-analogizing tasks
does not mean that I feel that "the similarity case and the proportional case
can be considered the same".
(See General Comment #2 above.)

Let me elaborate:
(I feel) a similarity-analogy is clearly a different (albeit similar) beast
from a proportional-analogy.  For example, the similarity-analogy
   [1]  "LENGTH is like MAPC"
must be different from the proportional-analogy
   [2]  "the iteration process in LENGTH is like the mapping-along process in MAPC",
even if the intent on stating [1] was, in fact, have been that [2] holds.
That is, the fact that [1] and [2] might somehow "represent the same thing"
(for example, after some initial surface-level processor,)
does not mean that they are the same.
(If nothing else they exhibit different surface-level structures.
This could easily lead to the famed "linguistic front-end" vs "deep
internal processing" quagmire, which I'll not pursue farther here.)
Perhaps this distinction should be considered a property of the analogy problem
statement, rather than of the analogy per se.

In conclusion; yes, there are some senses in which these three cases of
analogy can be considered similar (that's no doubt why the term "analogy"
applies to each of them).
However this does NOT mean that these cases should be labelled the same;
as there are dimensions in which they differ greatly.
****

      In the notes on page 15, you imply that the analogy understanding tasks 
    are involved only with the similarity analogies -- isn't this merely a 
    by-product of the way you have defined the senses of analogy? Must the senses
    of analogy be defined in terms of finding predicates? I'm not sure how these
    definitions correspond to either the mapping definition or your partial 
    theory definition of analogy.
****
Two responses:
i) No, that innocent-seeming "reasons" can encode a lot.  
I imagine being able to include the proportional aspects of the analogy
in this parameter.  Hence the proportional "Cow:Calf :: Ewe:Lamb" might be
stated as
	"Cow is like Ewe, (within the constraint)/in that
		a Cow's calf is like a Ewe's lamb",
or something like that.
(I still don't know what to do about familial case, though.)

ii) I was unable to figure what you mean by
	"Must the senses of analogy be defined in terms of finding predicates?".
Did you mean
  [1]	Why discriminate amongst the cases by virtue of the predicates found?
or
  [2]	Why *(unary) predicates* as opposed to *arbitrary (n-ary) relations*?
or
  [3]	Why *predicates* as opposed to *units and slots*?
or
  [4]	Why *finding* predicates as opposed to *applying* known predicates?
or ...

Let me try to answer each of these.  If you had meant none of these,
please resubmit the question.
[1] I'm not.  I'm discriminating amongst the cases by virture of
	top level surface form; and then noting what types of predicates
	seem appropriate for each such case.
[2] I do not consider this difference relevant.
	(This follows from my model-based perspective.)
[3] They're both "turing equivalent" -- 
	I choose predicate calculus because of its clean semantics.
[4] Many of the interesting, reformulation-related challenges derive from
	generating new predicates.  If I was limited to only applying known
	predicates I would never address that collection of issues.
****

       There really a clear distinction between the tasks involved in generating
    an analogy and the tasks which use the analogy to infer information. I don't
    however see the distinctions among the generation tasks -- to find an analogue
    requires finding the analogy, likewise judging or selecting analogue(s)
    requires finding the analogy. 
****
(Actually, "requires finding the analogIES."... just a small point)

Yes, one needs to find the analogy/ies to find the analogue -- so?
Here the PURPOSE of the over-task is different; even though the internal
processing will be, as you noticed, quite similar.

This point related to General Comment #2 above.
You seem to be basing you comments only the internals of the mechanism,
and ignoring the other ways in which two analogies can be compared.
****

      The incomplete algorithms on page 17 may be easier to see if the analogy is
    considered to be a mapping of relations (predicates) as well as a mapping of
    objects. For example, in the proportional case finding the analogy involves
    finding a relation between y and B having similar properties to the relation
    between x and A (the relations need not be identical, but R<x,A> must map
    into R'<y,B> in an analogy mapping from A to B which maps x to y). The 
    given constraint is just a means of limiting the allowable mappings from
    A to B.
****
Of course one wants to reason about, and compare/contrast, the relations
associated with both analogues!
I never (meant to) say contrary!
Using the "common partial theory" approach one need not even deal
with objects described using the same language, which implies, ipso facto,
that one can readily deal with relations as well as objects.
****

       The analogy application axis is definitely not "orthogonal"(independent)
    to the analogy task axis. The two application given are not really disjoint
    as shown by the examples given. In the linguistic application, the hearer is
    expected to make inferrences not directly communicated (otherwise, the
    analogy communicates no more than what is explicitly stated). Doesn't this
    mean the linguistic application includes the deductive/predictive 
    application?  Your elaboration of the applications actually says this!
****
Once again, you're only looking at the internal processing going on;
and ignoring other features of this analogy phenomena; which here is the overall
scenario.  (See General comment #2.)

Yes, as I explicitly stated, the mechanism responsible for processing
(at least) one side of the linguistic application MUST include a mechanism
similar to the one used for the deductive/predictive application.
****

      The "conclusiveness of derivation"(page 23) axis seems to apply only to the
    "using the analogy" task -- however, the provability of inferrences derived
    from an analogy can be used to judge the usefulness ness (goodness) of the 
    analogy itself. In this sense, this dimension can apply the analogy generation
    task.
****
What would it mean for a generated analogy to be "conclusive"?
(For comparison/illustration, recall that a "conclusive use of an analogy"
is one which leads to a correct (i.e. valid) deduction.)
This would obviously depend on the definition of "analogy",
and on the inferencing process which would then uses this analogy.

Perhap you were suggesting that a "goodness or usefulness" dimension should
be included as one of the axes.
An analogies position along this dimension would correlate with the number
(and nature) of "deductions" one could derive from this analogical-connection.
I had considered this, but was unable to even begin to quantify this --
not even enough to include it in even so preliminary a draft as the one I sent out.
Perhaps you have some suggestions...

I also puzzled over the phrase 
	"provability of inferrences[SIC] derived from an analogy".
Could you elaborate what you meant by that -- what is an inference derived from
an analogy? provable in what sense? based on what methods? etc.
****

      One picky point on page 24, instance to instance analogies are not really
    cases of learning from examples where the goal is to find a generalization
    which covers the presented examples.
****
[Minor parsing problem:
I assume you are claiming that learning from examples involves
finding a generalization which covers the presented examples.
The other parsing implies that instance to instance analogies, where the goal
is to find a generalization, is not a case of learning from example.]

Whose definition of "learning from example" are you citing?
Who said that it must involve finding the generalization of examples given?
Certainly not Simon, who is now claiming that a human expert has between 50-100K 
"relatively specific base cases" (my quotes) which he used in problem solving.
Quine (in his discussion of ostention,) appears to take an even more extreme
position -- in which implies that no generalization is ever acquired.
(In fact, besides Winston's early simplistic examples, and Tom Mitchell's
impressive MetaDendral (LEX?) work, I don't know of any (significant) learning
research which claims that generalization is REQUIRED to actually learn.  Please
correct this ignorance of mine...)

By the way, I'm defining "learning from example" as exhibiting superior
performance on subsequent examples, based on some prior experience with
sufficiently similar cases.  (Note this is totally behavioristic -- which
is why this entire issue, which deals exclusively with internal organization
of the facts, seems almost moot.)
****

       The degree of specificity dimension seems quite vague to me -- perhaps I
    have just missed the point completely!
****
The sentences
	"People are like birds"
and
	"John ate as many sun-flower seeds on June 24 as ..." 
are similar, in that both are discussing a comparison between humans and birds.
They are, however, somewhat different.
I propose we label this type of difference "specificity".

This dimension is still extremely qualitative -- I have no idea what the
units of specificity should be...  Suggestions?
****

       Isn't the define vs refine axis subsumed by the analogy task axis (i.e.
    analogy generation vs analogy use)
****
Yes, these two dimensions are not unrelated... but once again, you seem to only
consider the internal process needed to solve these two types of problems;
and to be ignoring the other aspects of the situation: here, the goal of the
person who posed the problem; and hence what he would consider an appropriate
answer.
****
      
       Obscure vs obvious is such a subjective distinction that I doubt its 
    usefulness in any automated analogizer where at any given time only one
    person's background (knowledge base ) can be available.
****
I totally agree.  This is related to something Doug Lenat was thinking about --
what would make an analogy humorous, as opposed to usable.
Needless to say, that topic is another issue which I never bothered to pursue,
and do not intend to.
****

       I am skeptical of the statement that any analogy can be described as a 
    modification of some parameter when the problem is stated in the correct
    representation.  (Unless the term parameter is given a meaninglessly 
    broad definition.)
****
Have you any counter-examples?  I claim I could always concoct a representation
in which the commonality of the analogues is "inherited", and the difference
is just one slot whose value differs for the two analogues.
Ahh, the joys of reformulation...

Realize, of course, that such a common unit might seem
highly artificial/strained/meaningless 
(see the obscure vs obvious discussion-ette, above).
****

       Doesn't the refined vs sloppy distinction really refer to the presence
    or absence of constraints on the analogy?  If this is so, I don't see a 
    clear distinction between this dimension and the following bounded vs
    unbounded dimension.
****
Both "sloppy" and "refined" are rather ill-defined terms.
A "refined analogy", by my way of thinking, would lead naturally 
(and "unavoidably") to a single analogy; whereas "sloppier" specifications
might not.

Certainly as we increase the constraints which are included in the
problem statement, we can only be restricting the number of "legal" analogies
which could be derived.  As such, by the definition given above, the
analogy-problem is becoming increasingly more refined.

There are, however, other ways a problem could be a refined analogy.
Perhaps the analogues belong to a sparse space, or we are working with a very
limited inferencing scheme.  (No, I'm not too happy with these either...)

Note that a "bound analogy problem" is (necessarily) more limited than the
corresponding unbound one -- and hence would be more refined.
****

       I agree that the interfield/intrafield distinction is not a very useful
    one -- however, the analogies between different fields certainly seem more
    powerful.
****
Any ideas why?  Perhaps because the useful intRAfield analogies have probably
already been noticed, and, indeed, have already included in the language for
describing that domain.
As such, they are considered obvious and self-evident.
***

       The additional dimensions stated for the metaphoric use of analogy seem
    to me to be either not very useful or subsumed by the other dimensions
    given.
**** perhaps ****

       Am I correct in assuming that the properties of analogy given in section 6
    are not meant to be further dimensions of analogy but rather characteristics
    which an automatic analogizer ought to exhibit?
****
Yes -- but not just AUTOMATIC analogiers.  I would hope that ANY analogizer,
natural or artificial, would exhibit these characteristics.
****

       I totally agree with your statements on the existence of more than one
    possible analogy between any two given analogues and the necessity for 
    reformulation in order to find the "best" analogy for the given task.
****
Reformulation is not ONLY used to find the "best" analogy; but may be needed
to find any analogy at all.
****

      I seem to recall that somewhere(can't seem to find it right now) you define
    reformulation as a transformation from one abstraction to another abstraction.
    Why isn't the transformation from the given analogue to an abstraction of 
    that analogue also an instance of reformulation? Certainly the abstraction 
    of the analogue is a different view (or representation ) of that analogue!
****
"...DIFFERENT view of that analogue."?
In my view the analogue is a model, as opposed to a theory.
It is, as such, a type error to consider the analogue as a representation
of itself.

I label that "analogue to abstraction" mapping the "abstraction process",
for want of a better name.
****

    THE END -- finally! I hope you will forgive the verbosity of this critique
    and the fact that so many of the comments seem somehow negative (I guess 
    differences between your view of analogy and mine will be more helpful to 
    you than the concurrence between our views).
****
No objections whatsoever -- I'm quite pleased that you spent so long in the
analysis; and just hope that you don't mind the verbosity and negative-ness
of my rebuttals.

Also, I'm not sure we disagree as much as simply mis-understand each other.
Hopefully we can begin to develop a common language as these discussions go on.
****

    Do send me any additional work as it is finished. I am definitely interested
    n the progress of your work.
**** will do ****

    Talk to you again soon,
			     Pat
****
I'm looking forward to hearing your reactions to these comments,
and to meeting you at AAAI.
Caio,
	Russ
****